Civil Evidence by Whitaker, Elizabeth D. & Hunt, Amy K.
SMU Law Review
Volume 51





Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review by
an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation





his Survey period has seen significant development in certain key
areas of evidence law. First, the Texas and federal courts have
continued to struggle with the standards relating to admissibility of
expert testimony. Second, the Supreme Court has elaborated on its com-
mon law based privilege rules, recognizing that confidential communica-
tions between patient and psychotherapist are privileged. Finally, there
has been the usual smattering of cases dealing with unique circumstances
and rarely applied rules of evidence. While we make no claim that this
Article encompasses every significant development of the past year, we
hope it will give the reader an idea of some of the significant develop-
ments in the area of civil evidence.
I. ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
In 1993, the United States Supreme Court decided Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,1 holding that under Rule 702 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, scientific evidence is not admissible unless it is "scien-
tifically valid" and "reliable."'2 The Daubert Court rejected the long fol-
lowed rule set out in Frye v. United States,3 which held scientific evidence
admissible when the offering party established that the technique or prin-
ciple had "gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it
belongs."'4 Instead, the Court adopted a "flexible ' 5 analysis, which in-
cluded consideration of the following factors in determining "whether a
theory or technique is scientific knowledge that will assist the trier of
fact":6 (1) "whether it can be (and has been) tested";7 (2) "whether the
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1. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
2. Id. at 597.
3. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
4. Id. at 1014.
5. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594.
6. Id. at 593.
7. Id.
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theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication"; 8
(3) "in the case of a particular scientific technique ... the known or po-
tential rate of error";9 and (4) "general acceptance."'10
Because the federal and state rules governing the admissibility of ex-
pert testimony are identically worded, 1' it was not long before the Texas
Supreme Court was faced with the same issue. In E.L Du Pont de
Nemours & Co. v. Robinson,12 the Court followed in Daubert's footsteps,
holding that Rule 702 "requires the proponent to show that the expert's
testimony is relevant to the issues in the case and is based upon a reliable
foundation."'1 3 In determining the reliability of scientific evidence, the
Court set out a list of non-exclusive factors it considered relevant to the
inquiry:
(1) the extent to which the theory has been or can be tested; (2) the
extent to which the technique relies upon the subjective interpreta-
tion of the expert; (3) whether the theory has been subjected to peer
review and/or publication; (4) the technique's potential rate of error;
(5) whether the underlying theory or technique has been generally
accepted as valid by the relevant scientific community; and (6) the
non-judicial uses which have been made of the theory or technique.14
Last year, the courts decided three cases of note on the issue of the
admissibility of expert testimony, two federal and one state. In the first,
Watkins v. Telsmith, Inc.,15 the Fifth Circuit addressed the issue of
whether the Daubert standard applied to non-scientific evidence. The is-
sue arose because Daubert itself involved the admissibility of novel scien-
tific evidence, and at least one circuit has held that "application of the
Daubert factors is unwarranted in cases where expert testimony is based
solely upon experience or training."'1 6 The Watkins court, however, re-
jected the Tenth Circuit's approach and held that the Daubert factors are
relevant to evaluating the admissibility of any expert testimony under
Rule 702.17
Watkins sued Telsmith, Inc., alleging that Telsmith was responsible for
the death of her husband, Eugene Watkins. Eugene was walking under a
conveyor, manufactured by Telsmith's predecessor, when a wire rope sup-
8. Id.
9. Id. at 594.
10. Id.
11. Compare FED. R. EvID. 702 with TEx. R. Civ. EvID. 702. Both rules state: "If
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to under-
stand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an
opinion or otherwise." Id.
12. 923 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. 1995).
13. Id. at 556.
14. Id. at 557 (citation and footnote omitted).
15. 121 F.3d 984 (5th Cir. 1997).
16. Compton v. Subaru of Am., Inc., 82 F.3d 1513, 1518 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S.
Ct. 611 (1996). The Ninth Circuit recently held that Daubert is inapplicable to a mechani-
cal engineer's testimony in a products liability case. See McKendall v. Crown Control
Corp., 122 F.3d 803, 806-07 (9th Cir. 1997).
17. See Watkins, 121 F.3d at 991.
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porting the conveyor snapped. The conveyor fell on Eugene, and he died
from his injuries the next day.
Watkins offered the testimony of an expert, Marcus Dean Williams,
"that the conveyor was unsafe and that alternative designs were feasi-
ble."' 8 Williams was a registered professional engineer. During World
War II, he was a B-17 pilot and maintenance supervisor. He later worked
for Boeing in facility engineering and tool design. His work experience
also included a stint with the Army Corps of Engineers and the Missis-
sippi Highway Department. Finally, Williams taught drafting, surveying,
structural design, and engineering materials at a junior college. Williams'
experience with conveyors included observing conveyors in use, although
Williams was unable to remember exactly how many of those conveyors
were supported by wire rope or the types or brands of the conveyors.
Despite his work experience, Williams lacked a mechanical engineering
background and his experience in machine design was "limited to a pro-
ject he conducted in one of his engineering classes in which he designed
the base of a chair." 19
In preparation for testifying in the case, Williams had examined the
reconstructed conveyor, reviewed the manufacturer's specifications for
the conveyor, and studied photographs of the conveyor. Williams did not
draw any alternative design and did not conduct any tests on proposed
alternative designs. Notably, Williams admitted that he reached his con-
clusion that the conveyor design was unsafe and that alternative designs
were feasible after only one day's work on the case.
The district court excluded Williams' testimony on the ground that it
was inadequate under the Daubert standard. On appeal, Watkins argued
that the standards set forth in Daubert applied only to "'scientific knowl-
edge' and expert testimony based on 'novel' scientific evidence. °20 This
case, Watkins claimed, presented no novelty, "but merely the application
of Williams's experience and common engineering principles to evaluate
the safety of this conveyor and envision alternative designs."''a Declining
to follow the Tenth Circuit case holding to the contrary,22 and instead
following the Seventh and Eighth Circuits,23 the court rejected Watkins'
arguments, holding that the standards set forth in Daubert applied to all
expert testimony.24
Specifically, the court held that a district court must first examine the
reliability of the expert's testimony.2 5 In determining whether the opin-
ion offered is reliable,
18. Id. at 986.
19. Id. at 987.
20. Id. at 988.
21. Id.
22. See supra note 16.
23. See Cummins v. Lyle Indus., 93 F.3d 362, 367 n.2 (7th Cir. 1996) (applying Daubert
to all expert testimony); Peitzmeier v. Hennessy Indus., Inc., 97 F.3d 293, 297 (8th Cir.
1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1552 (1997) (same).




[n]ot every guidepost outlined in Daubert will necessarily apply to
expert testimony based on engineering principles and practical expe-
rience, but the district court's 'preliminary assessment of whether the
reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically
valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be
applied to the facts in issue' is no less important. 26
The court further held that "the nonexclusive list of factors relevant
under Daubert to assessing scientific methodology-testing, peer review,
and 'general acceptance'-are also relevant to assessing other types of
expert evidence."127 To hold otherwise would be to endorse the admissi-
bility of testimony by an expert who purports "to rely on general engi-
neering principles and practical experience" and who simply states his
"conclusions were not reached by any particular method or technique."'2 8
Applying the Daubert factors to Williams' testimony, therefore, the
court of appeals agreed with the district court that Williams' opinions
were not sufficiently reliable to render them of assistance to the fact
finder.29 First, the court found that the proper methodology for propos-
ing alternative designs required more than mere conceptualization; test-
ing the design-whether by the expert or by someone else-was vital.30
Second, the court found that Williams' lack of direct experience with con-
veyors demonstrated an inadequate understanding of the machine. 31 Fi-
nally, the court noted that "Williams did not even make any drawings or
perform any calculations that would allow a trier of fact to infer that his
theory that the conveyor design was defective and that alternative designs
would have prevented the accident without sacrificing utility were sup-
ported by valid engineering principles."'32
Shortly after the Fifth Circuit decided Watkins, it issued another signifi-
cant Daubert opinion in Moore v. Ashland Chemical, Inc.33 In Moore, the
court focused on the differences between evaluating the admissibility of
expert testimony based on hard scientific evidence and expert testimony
based on clinical medical knowledge. While reaffirming that the general
Daubert principles did indeed apply to both hard science testimony and
clinical medical testimony, the court found that the Daubert factors were
simply inapplicable. 34
In Moore, the plaintiff was exposed to a mixture of chemicals that had
leaked from sealed drums carried inside his truck. At issue was whether
the plaintiff's respiratory ailments were caused by exposure to the chemi-
cals. At trial, the plaintiff offered the testimony of two clinical physicians
26. Id. (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93).
27. Id. at 991.
28. Id.
29. See id. at 992-93.
30. See id. at 992.
31. See id.
32. Id.
33. 126 F.3d 679 (5th Cir. 1997).
34. See id. at 688-89.
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who had examined and treated him. The trial court excluded the testi-
mony of one of the experts, but not the other. A divided panel reversed.
Judge Dennis, writing for the majority, first outlined the evidentiary
principles relevant to determining the admissibility of expert testimony.
Setting the stage for the rest of the opinion, Judge Dennis distinguished
between "hard scientific knowledge" and "knowledge outside the realm
of hard science."'35 Hard scientific knowledge, he stated, "'is based on
generating hypotheses and testing them to see if they can be falsified.' 36
The discipline of clinical medicine, by contrast, does not rely on hard sci-
entific knowledge. 37 Instead, the goals of a clinical physician include (1)
the care and treatment of the individual patient and (2) an examination
of the disease, the host, and the interaction between the disease and
host.38 The subject matter and conditions of a clinical physician's study
are likewise different from those arising in the hard science field. 39 For
instance, the hard scientist deals with animals, parts of a person, or an
inanimate system and can initiate experiments on her own time.40 The
clinical physician, on the other hand, deals with an "intact human being"
who initiates the treatment, "choosing the time, place, duration, and
clinician. '"41
Based on these differences, the majority concluded that the expert
opinion regarding causation offered by a clinical physician was admissi-
ble.42 In support of its reliability finding, the court cited the following
evidence relied upon by the expert in reaching his conclusion: (1) the
expert personally examined the plaintiff; (2) the expert personally took a
detailed medical history from the plaintiff; (3) the expert performed or
supervised a series of tests on the plaintiff, including pulmonary function
tests, a bronchial challenge test, a bronchodilator test, an allergy test, X-
rays, and laboratory tests; (4) the expert reviewed tests, reports, and the
opinions of other doctors who had examined the plaintiff; (5) the expert
reviewed the chemical manufacturer's material safety data sheet, which
revealed that the chemicals to which plaintiff was exposed could "cause
drowsiness and irritate nose and throat" as well as "injure blood, liver,
lungs, kidneys, and nervous system"; (6) the expert referred to medical
literature on the properties of chemicals that cause the plaintiff's ailment;
and (7) the expert utilized his admittedly extensive training and experi-
ence.43 Judge Davis dissented, arguing that "medical causation testimony
35. Id. at 685.
36. Id. (quoting Michael D. Green, Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence in
Toxic Substances Litigation: The Legacy of Agent Orange and Benedectin Litigation, 86
Nw. U. L. REV. 643, 645 (1992)).
37. See id. at 688.
38. See id. at 688-89.
39. See id. at 689.
40. See id.
41. Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
42. See id. at 694-705.
43. Id. at 693 n.3, 696-97.
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by physicians is indeed 'scientific' expert testimony."'44 On November 12,
1997, the Fifth Circuit decided to hear the case en banc.
The Texas courts have also had their share of Daubert-type cases. In
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Havner,45 the Texas Supreme Court
struggled with the issue of whether there was any evidence supporting a
jury verdict against Merrell Dow finding that its drug, Bendictin, caused
birth defects. In considering the no evidence point, the Court noted that
the mere testimony that, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty,
Bendictin caused the birth defects would not suffice-"[t]he substance of
the testimony must be considered. '46 Specifically, whether an expert's
testimony rises to the level of evidence depends on whether the testimony
is scientifically reliable.47 An expert's "bald assurance of validity is not
enough"; a court must objectively perform an independent validation of
the expert's methodology.48
When evaluating the reliability of an expert's opinion in determining a
no evidence point, the Court considered the factors set out in Robinson.49
Under that analysis, expert testimony could be found unreliable in two
different ways: (1) "[i]f the foundational data underlying opinion testi-
mony are unreliable, an expert will not be permitted to base an opinion
on that data because any opinion drawn from that data is likewise unreli-
able;"' 50 (2) "an expert's testimony is unreliable even when the underlying
data are sound if the expert draws conclusions from that data based on
flawed methodology. A flaw in the expert's reasoning from the data may
render reliance on a study unreasonable and render the inferences drawn
therefrom dubious." 51
Turning to the issue of the usefulness of epidemiological studies, the
Court concluded that
properly designed and executed epidemiological studies may be part
of the evidence supporting causation in a toxic tort case and that
there is a rational basis for relating the requirement that there be
more than a 'doubling of the risk' to our no evidence standard of
review and to the more likely than not burden of proof.52
44. Id. at 711.
45. 953 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. 1997).
46. Id. at 711.
47. See id. at 712, 714.
48. Id. at 712. Placing the court in the role of expert scientist has been criticized as
unworkable. See, e.g., Alexander Morgan Capron, Daubert and the Quest for Value-Free
"Scientific Knowledge" in the Courtroom, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 85, 97-105 (1996).
49. See Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 714; supra note 14 and accompanying text.
50. Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 714.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 717. Although an epidemiological study may provide some evidence of cau-
sation, it does not equate to causation. A study merely shows that there is a significant
association between two events or occurrences. For example, "there is a demonstrable
association between summertime and death by drowning, but summertime does not cause
drowning." Id. at 724 (citation omitted).
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While the doubling of the risk standard appears somewhat arbitrary and
certainly not conclusive evidence that an agent caused a disease, the
Court found it warranted because
the law must balance the need to compensate those who have been
injured by the wrongful actions of another with the concept deeply
imbedded in our jurisprudence that a defendant cannot be found lia-
ble for an injury unless the preponderance of the evidence supports
cause in fact. The use of scientifically reliable epidemiological stud-
ies and the requirement of more than a doubling of the risk strikes a
balance between the needs of our legal system and the limits of
science.53
Though the Court accepted the use of qualifying epidemiological studies,
it held that merely because the study might meet the litmus test, this does
not make it legally sufficient evidence of causation.54 The reason is that
an epidemiological study shows only an association, not causation.55 In
order to draw a conclusion about causation, a number of criteria should
be considered, including the strength of the association, the consistency of
the association, the plausibility of the association, and possible bias.56
Moreover, before accepting the epidemiological study, a court must
first satisfy itself that the study is reliable. In other words, the court must
feel confident that the study accurately concludes that the relative risk is
2.0-i.e., there is "a doubling of the risk."'57 The way this is done is to
determine a "confidence interval."'58 The Court adopted a ninety-five
percent confidence level, which means that "if the study were repeated
numerous times, the confidence interval would indicate the range of rela-
tive risk values that would result 95% of the time."'59 The confidence
interval would be acceptable unless it encompassed a relative risk factor
of 1.0, which would mean the study was inconclusive. 60 In addition to the
study's confidence interval, the Court held that there were other factors
to consider in evaluating a study's reliability, including "but certainly not
limited to, the sample size of the study, the power of the study, con-
founding variables, and whether there was selection bias." 61
Once the epidemiological study is deemed acceptable, a claimant must
then prove she is similarly situated to those in the studies.62 Evidence of
this would include
proof that the injured person was exposed to the same substance,
that the exposure or dose levels were comparable to or greater than
53. Id. at 718.
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. See id. at 718 n.2, 719. The Court also listed factors such as specificity, temporality,
biological gradient, coherence, experiment, and analogy as relevant to drawing the causal
conclusion. See id. at 718 n.2.
57. Id. at 721.
58. Id. at 723.
59. Id.
60. See id.
61. Id. at 724.
62. See id. at 720.
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those in the studies, that the exposure occurred before the onset of
injury, and that the timing of the onset of injury was consistent with
that experienced by those in the study.63
Moreover, "if there are other plausible causes of the injury or condition
that could be negated, the plaintiff must offer evidence excluding those
causes with reasonable certainty." 64
Finally, the Court examined the sufficiency of the Havner's scientific
evidence offered in support of causation in light of the Robinson factors.
The Court rejected the epidemiological studies offered by the Havners
and their experts on multiple grounds.65 First, many of the studies en-
compassed a confidence interval of 1.0.66 Others did not demonstrate
that taking Bendectin during pregnancy doubled the risk of birth de-
fects. 67 Still others did not disclose the confidence level used to deter-
mine the confidence interval.68
In addition to the statistical shortcomings of the studies, the Court
found other reasons to reject the Havners' epidemiological data. First,
none of the experts who testified had ever published their opinions in a
peer-reviewed journal. 69 In fact, of the over thirty studies that had been
published, none concluded that women who took Bendectin during preg-
nancy had an increased risk of limb reduction birth defects. 70 Second, the
Court found the testimony of questionable reliability since the studies
about which the experts were testifying were prepared only for use in
litigation.71
In addition to their epidemiological evidence, the Havners also offered
evidence of in vivo animal studies and in vitro studies in support of their
contention that Kelly Havner's birth defects were caused by her mother's
ingestion of Bendectin during pregnancy. The Court held that the animal
studies were no evidence of causation because the experts who offered
them could not extrapolate the high dosages required to produce the
animal results into human terms.72 The in vitro studies were likewise re-
jected as not providing a sufficiently concrete causal link between damage
that may be caused by direct application of a substance to a single cell




65. See id. at 724-30.
66. See id. at 725.
67. See id.
68. See id. at 726.
69. See id.
70. See id. at 708.
71. See id. at 726.
72. See id. at 729.
73. See id. at 730.
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II. PRIVILEGES
Unlike the Texas evidence rules, the federal rules do not give a laundry
list of privileges. In fact, Congress rejected the Judicial Conference Advi-
sory Committee's draft rules that had included a list of nine specific testi-
monial privileges and instead put the burden on the courts to glean from
"reason and experience" appropriate evidentiary privileges.74 As such,
Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United
States or provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the
Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a
witness, person, government, state, or political subdivision thereof
shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may
be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of rea-
son and experience. 75
In an effort to apply "reason and experience," in Jaffee v. Redmond,76
the United States Supreme Court recently decided whether to recognize
a psychotherapist-patient privilege. Mary Lu Redmond, a police officer,
shot and killed Ricky Allen. Following the shooting, Redmond received
extensive counseling from Karen Beyer, a licensed clinical social worker.
Allen's estate filed suit against Redmond and her employer, the Village
of Hoffman Estates, Illinois, claiming that Redmond used excessive force.
During discovery and at trial, the Allen estate sought access to Beyer's
notes. Although the district court ruled the notes were not protected
from disclosure, neither Beyer nor Redmond ever disclosed their con-
tents. As a result, the district court instructed the members of the jury
that they could presume that the contents of the notes would have been
unfavorable, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of the Allen estate.
In deciding whether to recognize Redmond and Beyer's privilege
claims, the Court first began with the general rule that testimonial privi-
leges are disfavored because they hinder the search for the truth.77 The
Court held that privileges are recognized only when they protect private
interests and serve public ends.78
The Court recognized that the psychotherapist-patient privilege serves
private interests because effective therapeutic treatment depends on the
patient's confidence and trust that the information disclosed during treat-
ment will not be revealed.79 The Court understood that disclosure could
cause embarrassment or disgrace, and its mere possibility would inhibit
the development of the confidential relationship necessary for successful
treatment.80
74. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1928 n.7 (1996).
75. FED. R. EVID. 501.
76. 518 U.S. 1 (1996).
77. See id. at 1928.
78. See id. at 1928-29.




In addition to the strong private interests that would be served by the
recognition of a psychotherapist-patient privilege, the Court held that
recognition of the privilege would serve public ends. 81 Specifically, the
Court found that a psychotherapist-patient privilege "serves the public
interest by facilitating the provision of appropriate treatment for individ-
uals suffering the effects of a mental or emotional problem. The mental
health of our citizenry, no less than its physical health, is a public good of
transcendent importance. ''82
Finally, the Court held that the benefits that would result from denying
this privilege would be modest, at best.83 The Court reasoned that were
patients to know that the substance of their therapeutic sessions could be
revealed, the development of the confidential relationship would be
thwarted and patients would be far less forthcoming to their therapists. 84
As a result, there would be fewer admissions against interest.85
The Court then turned to whether "reason and experience" supported
recognition of the privilege. Noting that all fifty states have recognized
the privilege, the Court found that a federal court's decision otherwise
would frustrate state legislative goals.86 In other words, the Court
wanted to avoid the result that disclosure in a state could vary depending
upon the court in which a dispute happened to land.
Finally, the Court held that the psychotherapist-patient privilege in-
cluded licensed social workers in their roles as therapists. 87 The Court
found extension of the privilege beyond traditional psychiatrists and psy-
chologists to be warranted given that social workers provide a significant
amount of mental health treatment. 88
While the general contours of the privilege are now recognized, the
Court left unresolved at least one issue that is sure to present difficult
issues for the lower federal courts in the years to come. First, the Court
made it clear that recognition of the privilege was not to be made on a
case by case basis, balancing the evidentiary need for disclosure with the
patient's privacy interests. 89 Rather, that balance was struck when the
Court decided the privilege does exist. However, the Court did state in a
footnote at the end of its decision that "we do not doubt that there are
situations in which the privilege must give way, for example, if a serious
threat of harm to the patient or to others can be averted only by means of
a disclosure by the therapist." 90 Thus, while disavowing a case by case
rebalancing, the Court at the same time suggested that there are situa-





86. See id. at 1930.
87. See id. at 1931.
88. See id.
89. See id. at 1932.
90. Id. at 1932 n.19.
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tions in which the public interest is outweighed by the individual's privacy
interests.
III. MISCELLANEOUS DECISIONS OF NOTE
A. CONSULTING EXPERT PRIVILEGE
The Texas Supreme Court recently revisited the consulting expert privi-
lege in General Motors Corp. v. Gayle.91 The Delarosas sued General
Motors (GM) after they suffered injuries as a result of a car crash, claim-
ing that GM defectively designed the seat belts in the Delarosas' pickup.
The trial court issued an order requiring GM to designate, before it con-
ducted any crash tests, whether it was conducting the tests for evidentiary
or consulting purposes. If the test was run for evidentiary purposes, then
GM was ordered to permit the Delarosas to attend and videotape or pho-
tograph the test. If the test was for consulting purposes only, the De-
larosas would not be permitted to attend. However, once GM ran a test
for consulting purposes, it could not later run a similar test for evidentiary
purposes. After an unsuccessful hearing before the court of appeals, GM
petitioned for mandamus relief before the Texas Supreme Court.
The Texas Supreme Court held that the trial court's order undermined
the consulting expert privilege.92 Rule 166b of the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure, which sets out the privilege, provides:
The identity, mental impressions and opinions of an expert who has
been informally consulted or of an expert who has been retained or
specially employed by another party in anticipation of litigation or
preparation for trial or any documents or tangible things containing
such information if the expert will not be called as an expert witness,
except that the identity, mental impressions and opinions of an ex-
pert who will not be called to testify as an expert and any documents
or tangible things containing such impressions and opinions are dis-
coverable if the consulting expert's opinion or impressions have been
reviewed by a testifying expert.93
The Court held that the purpose of the rule was to allow a party to de-
velop case theories:
If the expert's conclusions support the consulting party's case, that
expert may be designated as a witness for trial. If, on the other hand,
the expert's conclusions do not support the party's case, the identity
of the expert and his or her conclusions need not be revealed to the
other side.94
The rule also prevents the other side from "'receiving undue benefit from
an adversary's efforts and diligence." 95
91. 951 S.W.2d 469 (Tex. 1997).
92. See id. at 476.
93. TEX. R. CIv. P. 166b(3)(b).
94. Gayle, 951 S.W.2d at 474.
95. Id. (quoting Tom L. Scott, Inc. v. Mcllhany, 798 S.W.2d 556, 559 (Tex. 1990)).
1998]
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The Court rejected the Delarosas' suggestion that the holding would
permit GM to test a number of theories until it came up with a favorable
test.96 Instead, the Court pointed out that a crash test will only be admis-
sible at trial if the test conditions are substantially similar to the accident
conditions. 97 The Court also rejected the argument that the Delarosas
should have access to the crash tests because they did not have adequate
resources to perform their own tests, noting that "because the consulting
expert privilege protects the very core of a party's thought processes and
strategy regarding the litigation, there is no substantial hardship
exception. 98
B. EXPERT AFFIDAVITS
In Guthrie v. Suiter,99 the Houston Court of Appeals addressed the ad-
missibility of summary judgment evidence in a will contest. The testa-
trix's only living son, Guthrie, filed the contest after he learned he was
excluded from his mother's will. Guthrie claimed his mother, who had
undergone a frontal lobotomy before executing the will, lacked testamen-
tary capacity. The executor moved for summary judgment, which the
court granted. Although ultimately reversing the trial court's judgment,
the court of appeals did affirm a few of the trial court's decisions disal-
lowing some of Guthrie's evidence.
In response to the executor's motion, Guthrie offered the affidavit of
Dr. Francis J. Pirozzolo, Ph.D., which stated that based on his review of
"(1) letters from a Dr. Creed; (2) records from the Ohio Department of
Mental Health; (3) the motion for summary judgment; and (4) the affida-
vits filed in support of the motion for summary judgment," 100 he con-
cluded that the testatrix "probably was not competent to make a will." 10 1
The executor objected to the affidavit on the ground that it did not attach
the letters or mental health records. The trial court sustained the
objection.
Rule 166a(f) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in rele-
vant part, that
[s]upporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evi-
dence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to
testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all
papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached
thereto or served therewith.102
The court of appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in refusing to consider Dr. Pirozzolo's affidavit because neither the letters
96. See id. at 475.
97. See id.
98. Id.
99. 934 S.W.2d 820 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1996, no writ).
100. Id. at 824.
101. Id.
102. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a(f) (emphasis added).
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from Dr. Creed nor the records from the Ohio Department of Mental
Health were attached to the affidavit. 10 3
The mistake made in Guthrie probably resulted from reliance on Rule
703 of the Texas Rules of Evidence. Rule 703 states:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases
an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or reviewed by
the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied
upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or infer-
ences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in
evidence. 10 4
Normally during a trial, an expert will offer an opinion based on the re-
view of documents that are not offered or admitted in evidence. This
common trial practice, however, does not translate in the summary judg-
ment setting, at least according to the Houston Court of Appeals.
In yet another decision involving the sufficiency of an expert affidavit,
the San Antonio Court of Appeals refused to consider the conclusory
affidavit testimony of an interested expert witness. In Whittley v. Hes-
ton,105 Whittley sued Dr. Adrian Heston, a therapeutic optometrist, when
Dr. Heston failed to diagnose a retinal tear, which led to a loss of vision
in Whittley's left eye. Heston moved for summary judgment, claiming he
complied with the standard of care. The trial court granted Heston's mo-
tion, and the court of appeals reversed.
The court of appeals first held that
the affidavit of an interested expert is sufficient to establish compli-
ance with the standard of care if the witness: (1) states that he is
familiar with the applicable standard of care, (2) states with specific-
ity each examination and treatment performed, (3) states that the
acts of the physician were consistent with the appropriate standard
of care, and (4) states that there was no causal connection between
the physician's acts and the plaintiff's injury. 106
While Heston's affidavit stated he was familiar with the proper standard
of care, it never articulated the particularities of the standard of care.'
0 7
In addition, Heston failed to specify Whittley's complaints, the examina-
tion, or the treatment.'0 8 The court concluded that
[w]ithout a recital of these basic details, there is insufficient informa-
tion to allow a fact finder to determine what the standard of care is
and whether Dr. Heston met the standard. Under the circumstances,
Dr. Heston's statement that he complied with the applicable stan-
dard of care is no more than the conclusion of an interested witness
and does not support the summary judgment.10 9
103. See Guthrie, 934 S.W.2d at 825.
104. TEx. R. Cv. EVID. 703 (emphasis added).
105. 954 S.W.2d 119 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, no pet. h.).
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IV. CONCLUSION
As has been the case in recent years, evidentiary developments have
centered around expert testimony. Perhaps reflecting the increasing
complexity of trial practices, these decisions teach that the courts are ex-
ercising an ever increasing gatekeeper role and that the unwary practi-
tioner must pay careful attention to the sufficiency and reliability of the
expert's testimony.
